Cool article. Since you mention me, I thought I’d respond. Apologies for being long-winded, but I hope this is constructive and helpful. Classical philosophical zombies (pre-1990s philosophical zombies) are stipulated to be physically identical to phenomenal consciousness havers while not themselves being phenomenal consciousness havers. Classical zombies by definition lack phenomenal states. The classical definition of zombies is silent about whether zombies, despite lacking phenomenal states, might have other mental states. If it’s possible to have intentional states such as thoughts and judgements without having any phenomenal states, then the logical possibility is open for philosophical zombies to have judgements. Dennett attempts to exploit this in 1991 to argue against anti-physicalist approaches to consciousness. He devises a thought experiment of zimbos. Zimbos are philosophical zombies explicitly defined as having non-phenomenal intentional states such as thoughts and judgements. Dennett exploits the fact that if zimbos can have judgements, then they can have judgements about phenomenal states. He uses this to try to construct a reductio of antiphysicalism. Chalmers grapples with the same problem in 1996 and labels it “the paradox of phenomenal judgement”. The problem/argument goes like this. It is widely supposed that we know, and know with certainty, that we are conscious. But, just like external world skepticism ensues if you can have a belief about the external world without the belief being true (because, then, for all you know it’s false), so then can internal skepticism ensue: If judgements about phenomenal consciousness can exist even in beings who lack phenomenal consciousness, then for all we know the zombies are us. The paradox/contradiction is that if antiphysicalism is true we both know and do not know that we have phenomenal consciousness. The “solution” that many antiphysicalists are attracted to is to deny that zimbos are possible. Zombies are still possible according to these antiphysicalists, but zimbos are not—they insist that, lacking phenomenal consciousness, none of their brain states are actually judgements about phenomenal consciousness. Perhaps they don’t have judgements or thoughts at all. This does indeed block the paradox/reducto. Their story is that they are directly acquainted with their own qualia. This acquaintance reveals to them what consciousness is—their concept of consciousness (according to them) correctly represents what consciousness is. And so, when they (according to them) conceive of physical beings lacking phenomenal consciousness, they have knowledge of a real possibility, and (according to them) physicalism is false. What is the antiphysicalists definition of consciousness? They’ll tell you they don’t have (a noncircular) one, and that they don’t need one. They just directly introspect their, arguably nonphysical, phenomenal consciousness. And zombies, according to them, might utter the same words, but those zombie utterances don’t express actual thoughts. Anyway, the point of all this is to say: I don’t claim it’s a problem if your definition of phenomenal consciousness can be agreed to by zombies. I claim instead that it’s a problem if you’re advertising your definition as NEUTRAL with regard to the key debates and it can be agreed to by zombies. Antiphysicalists who have responded to zimbos/the paradox of phenomenal judgement in the above manner will say that zombies do not agree to the definition, they simply utter words that sound like agreement. The person claiming to offer a neutral definition can’t say that. They can’t because they would then be taking sides and thus not being neutral. And if the so-called neutral definition provider says that phenomenal consciousness lackers must be ignored in evaluating the definition, then what the provider is saying becomes circular, since they would be using the concept of phenomenal consciousness in their statement of what phenomenal consciousness needs to be.
Cool article. Since you mention me, I thought I’d respond. Apologies for being long-winded, but I hope this is constructive and helpful. Classical philosophical zombies (pre-1990s philosophical zombies) are stipulated to be physically identical to phenomenal consciousness havers while not themselves being phenomenal consciousness havers. Classical zombies by definition lack phenomenal states. The classical definition of zombies is silent about whether zombies, despite lacking phenomenal states, might have other mental states. If it’s possible to have intentional states such as thoughts and judgements without having any phenomenal states, then the logical possibility is open for philosophical zombies to have judgements. Dennett attempts to exploit this in 1991 to argue against anti-physicalist approaches to consciousness. He devises a thought experiment of zimbos. Zimbos are philosophical zombies explicitly defined as having non-phenomenal intentional states such as thoughts and judgements. Dennett exploits the fact that if zimbos can have judgements, then they can have judgements about phenomenal states. He uses this to try to construct a reductio of antiphysicalism. Chalmers grapples with the same problem in 1996 and labels it “the paradox of phenomenal judgement”. The problem/argument goes like this. It is widely supposed that we know, and know with certainty, that we are conscious. But, just like external world skepticism ensues if you can have a belief about the external world without the belief being true (because, then, for all you know it’s false), so then can internal skepticism ensue: If judgements about phenomenal consciousness can exist even in beings who lack phenomenal consciousness, then for all we know the zombies are us. The paradox/contradiction is that if antiphysicalism is true we both know and do not know that we have phenomenal consciousness. The “solution” that many antiphysicalists are attracted to is to deny that zimbos are possible. Zombies are still possible according to these antiphysicalists, but zimbos are not—they insist that, lacking phenomenal consciousness, none of their brain states are actually judgements about phenomenal consciousness. Perhaps they don’t have judgements or thoughts at all. This does indeed block the paradox/reducto. Their story is that they are directly acquainted with their own qualia. This acquaintance reveals to them what consciousness is—their concept of consciousness (according to them) correctly represents what consciousness is. And so, when they (according to them) conceive of physical beings lacking phenomenal consciousness, they have knowledge of a real possibility, and (according to them) physicalism is false. What is the antiphysicalists definition of consciousness? They’ll tell you they don’t have (a noncircular) one, and that they don’t need one. They just directly introspect their, arguably nonphysical, phenomenal consciousness. And zombies, according to them, might utter the same words, but those zombie utterances don’t express actual thoughts. Anyway, the point of all this is to say: I don’t claim it’s a problem if your definition of phenomenal consciousness can be agreed to by zombies. I claim instead that it’s a problem if you’re advertising your definition as NEUTRAL with regard to the key debates and it can be agreed to by zombies. Antiphysicalists who have responded to zimbos/the paradox of phenomenal judgement in the above manner will say that zombies do not agree to the definition, they simply utter words that sound like agreement. The person claiming to offer a neutral definition can’t say that. They can’t because they would then be taking sides and thus not being neutral. And if the so-called neutral definition provider says that phenomenal consciousness lackers must be ignored in evaluating the definition, then what the provider is saying becomes circular, since they would be using the concept of phenomenal consciousness in their statement of what phenomenal consciousness needs to be.