This and the previous post are a truly excellent discussion of the matter. I think I came up with the anti-hardest view independently (if your idea of “consciousness” is epiphenomenal, then I don’t care about that kind of consciousness. I care about what the zombie means when it says it sees red or enjoys ice cream.) instead of spice, I think of it as a soul, or Dennett’s niftyness. Your presentation is really helpful in considering how to present my thoughts.
One thing I was hoping for but missed was the consideration of information. My current thought is that in your formula of Σ = ρ+Δ, ρ may be physical/functional properties but Δ may be informational properties, which are determined by ρ but are independent of ρ in that they are multiply realizable.would that be a correct assessment of the formula?
As a card carrying functionalist, I have to admit I don't even know what many philosophers are talking about when they discuss non-functional consciousness. And with only a few exceptions (early Frank Jackson for example), most seem to want to deny the most obvious implication of positing a non-causal view of consciousness, that it's causally impotent, that it makes no difference in the world, but it's not clear to me how that can be done coherently.
As I noted on your last post, I've taken my own shot at more precise terminology. But after several conversations with hardists about it, I'm starting to despair that new terminology will ever be a lasting solution. I think of Dennett's comment in his 1988 Quining Qualia paper. (Which was before both Block and Chalmers complained about terminological issues and introduced new terminology.)
"I am out to overthrow an idea that, in one form or another, is "obvious" to most people--to scientists, philosophers, lay people. My quarry is frustratingly elusive; no sooner does it retreat in the face of one argument than "it" reappears, apparently innocent of all charges, in a new guise."
Along those lines, don't be surprised if hardists say something like, "Yes, yes, exactly. But you know, the real hard problem is how we have ostensional consciousness."
This and the previous post are a truly excellent discussion of the matter. I think I came up with the anti-hardest view independently (if your idea of “consciousness” is epiphenomenal, then I don’t care about that kind of consciousness. I care about what the zombie means when it says it sees red or enjoys ice cream.) instead of spice, I think of it as a soul, or Dennett’s niftyness. Your presentation is really helpful in considering how to present my thoughts.
One thing I was hoping for but missed was the consideration of information. My current thought is that in your formula of Σ = ρ+Δ, ρ may be physical/functional properties but Δ may be informational properties, which are determined by ρ but are independent of ρ in that they are multiply realizable.would that be a correct assessment of the formula?
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A lot of good stuff in this long post.
As a card carrying functionalist, I have to admit I don't even know what many philosophers are talking about when they discuss non-functional consciousness. And with only a few exceptions (early Frank Jackson for example), most seem to want to deny the most obvious implication of positing a non-causal view of consciousness, that it's causally impotent, that it makes no difference in the world, but it's not clear to me how that can be done coherently.
As I noted on your last post, I've taken my own shot at more precise terminology. But after several conversations with hardists about it, I'm starting to despair that new terminology will ever be a lasting solution. I think of Dennett's comment in his 1988 Quining Qualia paper. (Which was before both Block and Chalmers complained about terminological issues and introduced new terminology.)
"I am out to overthrow an idea that, in one form or another, is "obvious" to most people--to scientists, philosophers, lay people. My quarry is frustratingly elusive; no sooner does it retreat in the face of one argument than "it" reappears, apparently innocent of all charges, in a new guise."
Along those lines, don't be surprised if hardists say something like, "Yes, yes, exactly. But you know, the real hard problem is how we have ostensional consciousness."