The final step, for me, is recognising that the only instanantion of what red is like for me exists in a neural pattern in one brain, and that pattern is not even red. Not even slightly red.
If you have come here from r/consciousness, please drop a note below saying where you stand and, if you like, let me know who you are back on the other platform.
Hmm. Not sure if I'm a gap denialist or deflationist. Maybe I don't understand you properly, not being that well versed in the terminology, nor a native English speaker.
I mean... While previously puzzled by the Hard Problem, and the EG, I am, most of the time, not anymore. When I think about it, I am certainly a denialist, but I have impulses and intuitions to the contrary that make themselves noticed from time to time. And I believe these intuitions are part of self-model-importance-signalling mechanisms that I certainly wouldn't want to be without since I think they are crucial to bringing the a kind of "magic" and meaning into existence through mere computation, as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy (and yes, of course, without these mechanisms there would be no "wanting" them to remain intact ).
Also, I believe that natural selection has formed us to uphold our inner models as the most unquestionably real, irreducible and important "thing" in the world. Couple that with memetic evolution and you get widespread religion, souls, and other anti-physicalist belief systems. In short, incredibly powerful cognitive biases, core to the success of humanity, I would say.
This may be possible to suppress to a significant degree, but in the sense that I think it is neither possible nor desirable to completely purge completely. I think the root causes of the EG are permanent and so EG will remain permanent in some sense.
That said, I do think introspection can be perfectly compatible with illusionism (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRuOEfnqV6g) and much of the time that I reflect and introspect on the EG, I do not believe or experience that it exists in any way. So.. Mostly 1?
Second, I challenge that there is such a thing as the brain state of knowing what red looks like. If we however take my brain state at future point in timewhen I am looking at something red, then I do not think that my brain can reach exactly that state by any other means than the exact inputs that lead to that state.
Mary certainly cannot learn what it will be like for her to see red by studying all the physical facts about neurophysiology in ordinary humans. Nor can she predict the physical brain state that her brain will be in when she is let out by studying ordinary humans. She could only predict her own future physical brain state were a super scientist knowing all the physical facts about her own brain and body and the future stimuli. Then, of course, the limits of self-referential systems would apply, and if she could still not know what it would be like without it being like that, right now, just as my memory of what my experience yesterday was like is not the same as what my experience yesterday was like.
I don’t see how the inability me to know what something is like without experiencing it first hand amounts to an explanatory gap. I think I should still be able to defend Gap Denialism.
EDIT:
Okay, I now saw that you defined Jacksonian derivation. I suspected that’s what it meant but I was unsure.
So yeah. I reject your classes. I think I can deny the validity of the explanatory gap and maintain that Jacksonian derivation is not possible, because of the limits of self-referential systems and that black-and-white stimuli are different from colour stimuli.
Also. To me it is obvious that Mary, pre-release, does not see the world in what we call black-and-white - what we would see if we came into her room. She doesn’t for example, experience any lack of colour. This is crucial to the black-and-white “feel”. This is important for understanding that when Mary is released, if she can differentiate colours well (which is questionable), then whatever she experiences when seeing red it is very different from what you or I experience when seeing red.
EDIT 2:
OK, arguably it's your spectrum, so you set the rules :) but it kinda boils down to this for me: I think that accepting the limitations of introspection, the lack of privileged access, does not necessitate admitting that there is any explanatory gap. And I think it's a mistake to think of the redness of red as a particular brain state. IMHO.
It’s not so much a single brain state but the entire set of brain states that can be described as matching the standard layperson’s sense of knowing what red looks like.
We could subdivide it into knowing WRLL without it being actively considered (like I might know what 12×12 is but don’t usually think about it) versus actively thinking about what red looks like.
Colour-blind folk, for instance, cannot create the state of KWRLL.
Whether KWRLL can be reached from black-and-white inputs is an empirical question, not a philosophical one, though it has philosophical implications.
Thank you for the clarification. Given the restrictions of human brain self-manipulation and self-referential systems, category 2 is the best fit for me, then. Although I still resist it lol.
I take it that you think there is such a thing as the redness of red that you and I experience, that this corresponds to a rough brain state, and that it is roughly the same experience and brain state that Mary experiences upon release? And you think that Mary sees black-and-white pretty much as you or I do, and that her brain state is roughly the same as yours or mine in a black and white room? If so you're a kind of physicalist qualia realist then, as I see it. Interesting!
How do you think whether KWRLL can be achieved without red stimuli is an empirical question?
If we test any number of subjects deprived of red all their life, and they all say Ah, that’s what red looks like, have we found out that they experience something similar to you and me when we see red?
What about this: you tell me everything you have to say about your favourite song that I haven’t heard, and then I hear it and exclaim Ah, that’s what it sounds like! It’s not implausible that I wouldn’t be that fond of it. Are you still convinced that I now know what hearing the song is like - if you really listen to it properly - like you do?
The final step, for me, is recognising that the only instanantion of what red is like for me exists in a neural pattern in one brain, and that pattern is not even red. Not even slightly red.
If you have come here from r/consciousness, please drop a note below saying where you stand and, if you like, let me know who you are back on the other platform.
Edited to add group zero, for Mendik.
Subject to revision, as it might not reflect the view he really holds.
I am a gap deflationist.
There are at least dozens of us!
#2, like yourself.
good…. the only defensible one!
Hmm. Not sure if I'm a gap denialist or deflationist. Maybe I don't understand you properly, not being that well versed in the terminology, nor a native English speaker.
I mean... While previously puzzled by the Hard Problem, and the EG, I am, most of the time, not anymore. When I think about it, I am certainly a denialist, but I have impulses and intuitions to the contrary that make themselves noticed from time to time. And I believe these intuitions are part of self-model-importance-signalling mechanisms that I certainly wouldn't want to be without since I think they are crucial to bringing the a kind of "magic" and meaning into existence through mere computation, as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy (and yes, of course, without these mechanisms there would be no "wanting" them to remain intact ).
Also, I believe that natural selection has formed us to uphold our inner models as the most unquestionably real, irreducible and important "thing" in the world. Couple that with memetic evolution and you get widespread religion, souls, and other anti-physicalist belief systems. In short, incredibly powerful cognitive biases, core to the success of humanity, I would say.
This may be possible to suppress to a significant degree, but in the sense that I think it is neither possible nor desirable to completely purge completely. I think the root causes of the EG are permanent and so EG will remain permanent in some sense.
That said, I do think introspection can be perfectly compatible with illusionism (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRuOEfnqV6g) and much of the time that I reflect and introspect on the EG, I do not believe or experience that it exists in any way. So.. Mostly 1?
Maybe I can expand. Take the brain state of knowing what red looks like (KWRLL). Can this state be reached with black-and-white textual inputs alone?
If your answer is not yes, you are not a Gap Denialist.
Hmmm. I suspect this can get complicated.
First, KWRLL?
Second, I challenge that there is such a thing as the brain state of knowing what red looks like. If we however take my brain state at future point in timewhen I am looking at something red, then I do not think that my brain can reach exactly that state by any other means than the exact inputs that lead to that state.
Mary certainly cannot learn what it will be like for her to see red by studying all the physical facts about neurophysiology in ordinary humans. Nor can she predict the physical brain state that her brain will be in when she is let out by studying ordinary humans. She could only predict her own future physical brain state were a super scientist knowing all the physical facts about her own brain and body and the future stimuli. Then, of course, the limits of self-referential systems would apply, and if she could still not know what it would be like without it being like that, right now, just as my memory of what my experience yesterday was like is not the same as what my experience yesterday was like.
I don’t see how the inability me to know what something is like without experiencing it first hand amounts to an explanatory gap. I think I should still be able to defend Gap Denialism.
EDIT:
Okay, I now saw that you defined Jacksonian derivation. I suspected that’s what it meant but I was unsure.
So yeah. I reject your classes. I think I can deny the validity of the explanatory gap and maintain that Jacksonian derivation is not possible, because of the limits of self-referential systems and that black-and-white stimuli are different from colour stimuli.
Also. To me it is obvious that Mary, pre-release, does not see the world in what we call black-and-white - what we would see if we came into her room. She doesn’t for example, experience any lack of colour. This is crucial to the black-and-white “feel”. This is important for understanding that when Mary is released, if she can differentiate colours well (which is questionable), then whatever she experiences when seeing red it is very different from what you or I experience when seeing red.
EDIT 2:
OK, arguably it's your spectrum, so you set the rules :) but it kinda boils down to this for me: I think that accepting the limitations of introspection, the lack of privileged access, does not necessitate admitting that there is any explanatory gap. And I think it's a mistake to think of the redness of red as a particular brain state. IMHO.
KWRLL = Knowing What Red Looks Like
It’s not so much a single brain state but the entire set of brain states that can be described as matching the standard layperson’s sense of knowing what red looks like.
We could subdivide it into knowing WRLL without it being actively considered (like I might know what 12×12 is but don’t usually think about it) versus actively thinking about what red looks like.
Colour-blind folk, for instance, cannot create the state of KWRLL.
Whether KWRLL can be reached from black-and-white inputs is an empirical question, not a philosophical one, though it has philosophical implications.
Thank you for the clarification. Given the restrictions of human brain self-manipulation and self-referential systems, category 2 is the best fit for me, then. Although I still resist it lol.
I take it that you think there is such a thing as the redness of red that you and I experience, that this corresponds to a rough brain state, and that it is roughly the same experience and brain state that Mary experiences upon release? And you think that Mary sees black-and-white pretty much as you or I do, and that her brain state is roughly the same as yours or mine in a black and white room? If so you're a kind of physicalist qualia realist then, as I see it. Interesting!
I would not put it quite like that, but my full answer is complicated. I can't be a realist about qualia because the word is not well defined.
Thanks.
How do you think whether KWRLL can be achieved without red stimuli is an empirical question?
If we test any number of subjects deprived of red all their life, and they all say Ah, that’s what red looks like, have we found out that they experience something similar to you and me when we see red?
What about this: you tell me everything you have to say about your favourite song that I haven’t heard, and then I hear it and exclaim Ah, that’s what it sounds like! It’s not implausible that I wouldn’t be that fond of it. Are you still convinced that I now know what hearing the song is like - if you really listen to it properly - like you do?